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Abstract. Physics appears to be in a unique position to withstand antirealist attacks, especially 
„pessimistic induction‟ arguments. Such resilience provides an incentive for embracing a 
„structural‟ variant of scientific realism. Nevertheless, an examination of the physics-
mathematics relationship suggests that whatever determines the success of modelling 
endeavours lends scant support to structural realism. A closer look at conceptual prerequisites 
of joint ab initio derivations of (i) Galilean and „special‟ relativity theories and (ii) classical and 
„quantal‟ probabilistic frameworks also fosters scepticism about a major claim of structural 
realists: that mathematical features of theoretical frameworks – those, in particular, which 
determine their predictive efficiency – are ultimately rooted in „structural‟ aspects of the 
natural world. Further concerns with the central tenets of structural realism are finally briefly 





1. How physics survives pessimistic induction 
 
Outside, perhaps, our „philosophical‟ moments, all of us go about our daily lives as 
though realism were self-evident. A realist attitude might well be a prerequisite for 
consciousness-endowed beings to survive and prosper. Don‟t, moreover, the 
overwhelming success of science and the ubiquity of its technological by-products 
provide further and glaring evidence that it is not only legitimate to be a realist, but 
that failing to be would verge on insanity?  How could we know and be able to do 
so much if our scientific theories did not somehow „reach out‟ to the actual being 
and properties of a preexisting objective world, and reliably inform us about them? 
Those very widely shared and deep-seated „intuitions‟ form the basis of a 
philosophical doctrine known as scientific realism (ScR). ScR holds, first and 
foremost, that key terms in our currently successful theories refer to genuine entities 
„in the world‟.  Insofar as our theories provide a successful account of phenomena, 
what they tell us about such entities captures something of what they truly are.      
At any given time science provides, if not a true picture of reality, at least an 
approximately true one. Scientific endeavour has steadily and considerably 
increased and refined our understanding of „external‟ reality. New theories improve 
on the success of their predecessors, in a process that may involve drastic or  
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„revolutionary‟ changes: compare, for example, Newton‟s and Einstein‟s accounts 
of gravity. Since scientific realists, which certainly include most scientists, regard 
the progress of science as converging to truth Larry Laudan
1
, a notorious critic of 
ScR, refers to that doctrine as convergent realism. 
According to scientific realism, those theories that have reached a mature enough 
stage and whose predictive record is virtually flawless yield an approximately true 
account of those aspects of the world they deal with. The entities they posit do exist 
in the world, and what those theories tell us about their attributes and behaviour is a 
broadly correct approximation to the truth, albeit one that may always be improved 
on. Not everything in a theory may approximate truth to the same degree. However, 
those constituents of a theory that are relevant to its predictive success must be 
somehow „truthlike‟, lest that success be utterly incomprehensible.  
Empirical adequacy is crucial for sifting out „good‟ theories from more or less 
worthy competitors and building trust in the winners. Above all, however, the 
advocates of ScR regard empirical success as a tell-tale sign that a currently 
favoured theory genuinely „latches on‟ to objective features of physical reality. 
Opponents have not failed to object that empirical evidence underdetermines 
theories, so that it can never be asserted for sure that any one is actually „closer to 
truth‟ than other similarly successful contestants. Nonetheless, as supporting 
evidence keeps piling up, it gets ever more unlikely for credible competitors to 
catch up. Isn‟t the „winning‟ theory simply that which, to date, yields the best fit 
with reality? Despite massive critical fire, the realist remains convinced that the 
position (s)he defends is that which makes the best possible sense of indisputable 
and persistent success. This „inference to the best explanation‟ is usually paired with 
what, in its most radical form, has come to be known as the „no miracle argument‟ 
(NMA): ScR is, as Hilary Putnam put it, the only doctrine that does not make 
scientific success sound like a miracle. In a slightly attenuated form, ScR would be 
the only account of the success of theories that does not make such success 
overwhelmingly unlikely: let‟s call it the „Greatest Likelihood Argument‟ (GLA). 
The GLA, however, succumbs to the well-known probabilistic „base rate fallacy‟: 
depending on what probability value (as a measure of one‟s „degree of belief‟) is 
assigned a priori to a given theory, any posterior, evidence-based probability that 
the theory in question is „on the right track‟ can follow, including one that is as low 
as one likes
2– or rather wouldn‟t like, if one is a convergent realist. Whether or not 
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one cares  to quantify it, the NMA/GLA is above all the expression of a strongly felt 
„hunch‟; one that is so ingrained indeed that the realist is not going to give it up 
without a fight. Because of his unshakable commitment to the idea of an „external‟ 
world as both the source and ultimate target of scientific knowledge, the realist can 
or would simply not, short of a „miracle‟, think of any serious competitor to ScR, 
when it comes to justifying the impressive successes of science.  
It is tempting to think that our well-corroborated theories yield approximate truth 
about reality. However, didn‟t past thinkers feel just the same about their own 
cherished, but now defunct „scientific‟ theories? Thanks to its epicycles, Ptolemaic 
astronomy was useful to navigators and praised for centuries for its accuracy, 
despite its getting the basic facts wrong. Closer to us, Newton‟s mechanics and 
gravitation theories, once held to be the pinnacle of human achievement, reached 
their limits on various grounds and were replaced by theories whose premises and 
methodology are fundamentally different. Who knows whether the theories we now 
favour will not end up on the heap, being eventually proven as thoroughly 
misguided as the ones they dethroned? On which grounds can one claim that 
„scientific‟ efforts sometimes get it even approximately right about the world? Some 
antirealists argue that the historical record gives us serious cause for pessimism 
regarding the ability of our current theories to approximate truth. Larry Laudan‟s 
contribution to the debate includes a list
3
 of past scientific endeavours that were 
once deemed successful but which, for us who know better, were hopelessly off-
beam. Laudan‟s list aims to render the NMA impotent by displaying a significant 
number of counterexamples. If the inherent fallibility of inductive arguments 
prevents it from being the last word, the ensuing „inference to the irrationality of 
convergence claims‟, better known as pessimistic (meta-)induction, would still be 
one of the most severe setbacks ever suffered by ScR.  
Laudan‟s list is intended to impress. On closer inspection, however, does it really 
hold its promise? About a quarter of the list pertains to what we might, rather 
charitably, call „paleobiology‟: the humoral „theory‟ of medicine, „theories‟ of 
spontaneous generation, the vital force „theories‟ of physiology. If those do qualify 
as conceptions, it is debatable whether they qualify as theories, let alone scientific 
ones, given our current understanding of what scientific practice involves. They are 
merely plausible and to a large extent a priori stories about living organisms or the 
human body; and so is catastrophist „geology‟ as applied to the Earth and its 
changes of appearance over millenia. None of those „theories‟ critically relies on 
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cautious experimentation, nor do they make use of the kind of highly constrained 
and controlled reasoning we have come to associate with the „scientific method‟. 
Most of them also pay tribute to influential, „venerable‟ figures such as Galen or 
Aristotle (not to mention biblical references). They commonly resort to the weight 
of authority (magister dixit), in sharp contrast to the „find out for yourself and don‟t 
be intimidated by some alleged authority‟ attitude that has (ideally!) been that of the 
scientist since, say, Galileo. As for their success, well: Molière didn‟t think much of 
his GP. Moving down the list, crystalline spheres are nothing but a concession to 
Aristotle‟s metaphysics, which abhors the idea of a perfect vacuum – hence the 
heavenly fill-up. Ptolemaic astronomy itself is a mixture of traditional cosmological 
conceptions and ingenious, ad hoc algorithmic procedures. The crystalline sphere 
idea, however, plays no part in implementing those procedures, and it cannot 
therefore be credited for their efficiency. Despite its computational merits, it is hard 
to confer scientific status to Ancient and Medieval astronomy, just as we should 
refrain from calling Mayan „astronomy‟ scientific, despite the confounding 
accuracy of the „methods‟ devised by Mayan priests. Should Platonic speculations 
in Kepler‟s Mysterium Cosmographicum count as scientific theories, as his later 
careful statement of three basic laws of planetary motion certainly does? 
Are phlogiston theory, the caloric theory of heat and the effluvial theory of static 
electricity more worthy candidates? The phlogiston idea originates in Johann 
Blecher‟s 1667 Physica Subterranea. Blecher postulates the existence of a „natural 
element‟ – so-called terra pinguis – which is supposedly released by combustible 
substances when they are burned. Its ad hoc character makes phlogiston an unlikely 
candidate as the central concept of a bona fide scientific theory
4
. The predictive 
success of the phlogiston view of combustion is not easy to ascertain, let alone 
quantify, because the „theory‟ lacked the support of substantial mathematical 
modelling. It probably owes its longevity and limited „success‟ to a coincidence: 
phlogiston was thought, unwittingly, to operate as a sort of negative of oxygen: 
what chemistry would eventually understand as consumption of oxygen was 
regarded as phlogiston release. As for Gilbert‟s effluvial conception of static 
electricity, a look at his De Magnete (1600) betrays its Aristotelian persuasion.   
This is, again, speculative „dreaming‟ that can at best support a „narrative‟ whose 
plausibility must be evaluated in its historical context.  
Unlike phlogiston or effluvia, the caloric idea did contribute to undeniable scientific 
developments.  It did enjoy a fair amount of explanatory success (e.g. it does rather 
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neatly account for the cooling of a hot liquid at room temperature) and could 
provide some justification for the gas laws. Laplace was a calorist, and so was Sadi 
Carnot, whose seminal 1824 work on thermodynamics assumes the caloric nature of 
heat. Significantly though, Carnot‟s accomplishments are totally independent of that 
assumption. Laplace‟s rather loose commitment to the caloric view was certainly 
useful in suggesting to him the addition of a constant (currently known as the 
„adiabatic index‟) to the equation Newton had derived for the propagation of an 
acoustic disturbance in an elastic medium. This, in particular, results in a substantial 
correction to Newton‟s prediction of the speed of sound5. Thus caloric, as a guiding 
idea, was a useful fiction; presumably because of what it may suggest in terms of 
heat „flowing‟ from one body or one spatial region to another. If anything, it 
provided an incentive for refining the mathematical models of acoustic phenomena 
or reflecting, as Carnot did, on the „motive power of fire.‟ 
We no longer believe in caloric, phlogiston or effluvia. Neither are we often 
impressed by what the theories that invoked them achieved. If they were successful 
at all, the kind of success those theories enjoyed greatly varies, ranging from 
plausible explanations (as judged, at least, by the cultural standards of their time) to 
satisfactory quantitative predictions – but the latter may have owed more to 
modelling ingenuity than to the attachment of their authors to the basic tenets of the 
theories in question. Above all, if „striking predictive successes...is a precondition 
of acceptance
6‟, then most items on Laudan‟s list simply do not qualify. 
Remarkably, those few theories that were undeniably successful in predicting 
phenomena, in a quantitative manner as well as qualitately, happen to fit within our 
current conception of physical theories. Those are the theories that did not die in 
vain, i.e. those theories whose successful predictions have been most resilient to the 
demise of putative ontologies: Fresnel‟s optics, Newton‟s mechanics, Maxwell‟s 
electrodynamics... Their resilience, as we shall see, has very much to do with their 
hinging, at a basic and „structural‟ level, on mathematical concepts and techniques. 
What remains to be seen, however, is whether focusing on that particular aspect can 
help rescue scientific realism or lend support to some variant thereof. Should the 
realist wish to follow the lead and come up with a „structural‟ (presumably 
weakened) variety of ScR, it must be borne in mind that the scope of  the endeavour 
will be confined to physical theories. 
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Laudan makes much of the empirical success of Fresnel‟s optics. This theory 
accurately predicts interference or diffraction effects. Some of the predicted 
phenomena are actually quite surprising, making such predictive success all the 
more remarkable. The realist might seize the opportunity and point it out as 
evidence that genuine aspects of the physical world have been captured by Fresnel‟s 
account. There‟s the rub, however, for despite the success of Fresnel‟s predictions, 
the ontology he advocated (wave-like disturbances propagating in an all-pervading 
elastic medium) is now believed, with good reason, to be utterly mistaken. Doesn‟t 
this clearly show that putative ontologies are essentially irrelevant to predictive 
success? Laudan, however, misrepresents Fresnel‟s achievement, making it sound 
as if Fresnel‟s belief in an optical ether was actually instrumental in his account of 
diffraction. Given the fate of his belief, wouldn‟t such dependence make his striking 
and enduring success very implausible? On closer inspection, Fresnel‟s predictions 
are found to hinge not so much on speculation about the nature and properties of an 
underlying medium as on the effective development of a key idea: that of periodic 
variations, subject to the sort of constraints and conditions that are part and parcel of 
mathematical modelling (which may involve requirements of symmetry, isotropy, 
homogeneity etc.). It is as a seasoned practitioner of the art of modelling, and not as 
a speculative thinker, that Fresnel succeeded in „squeezing out‟ very striking 
predictions. This is how physicists and engineers work at their best, and certainly 
the reason why the relations Fresnel derived have actually survived the demise of 
his personal ontological preferences.  
Those, like Laudan, who dwell on „ontological losses‟ suffered as a result of radical 
theory change might well exaggerate (if only to deny it) the importance of 
metaphysical baggage as a crucial factor to the effectiveness of physical theories. 
Besides, however short-lived ontologies may be, there does appear to be a 
substantial carry-over, at some level, from one worthy physical theory to the next.  
If such inheritance, or retention, is not illusory, it would occur despite the loss of 
„central terms that (we now believe) were nonreferring7.‟ Its occuring at a much 
more abstract, „structural‟ level, would make such retention relatively insensitive to 
the fate of ontologies. What else, then, to look for than „that‟ which certain 
mathematical relations encapsulate within frameworks whose predictions are 
(undeniably) successful? As for ontologies, their substantive contribution to 
predictive efficiency might well boil down to the power of imagery and to their – 
limited and somewhat unreliable – capacity to suggest specific modelling 
approaches (as in Fresnel‟s optics or Fourier‟s analytic theory of heat). 
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2. Realism goes ‘structural’ 
 
In his essay La science et l’hypothèse, Henri Poincaré downplays the importance of 
postulated entities, such as Fresnel‟s ether or Lorentz‟s electron. He regards them as 
convenient fictions and contrasts them with the enduring „truth‟ of laws and 
equations:  
„Never mind whether the ether really exists, for this is the business of 
metaphysicians; what matters for us [physicists] is that everything happens as if 
it did exist and that this hypothesis is convenient for the explanation of 
phenomena. After all, do we have any other reason to believe in the existence of 
material objects? There again, it is merely a convenient hypothesis; however, it 
will never cease to be, whereas one day will no doubt come when the ether is 
rejected as useless
8
. But on that very day, the laws of optics and the equations 
that express them analytically will remain true, at least as a first approximation. 
It will therefore be useful to study a doctrine that connects all those equations
9.‟  
Despite the eventual rejection of Fresnel‟s and other theories, „the differential 
equations [the authors of those theories came up with and successfully used for 
making predictions] are always true, they may always be integrated by the same 
methods and the results of this integration still preserve their value
10.‟ Hypotheses 
that led to deriving those equations may well have been unwarranted beliefs or 
illusions, but they somehow served as a guide to their derivation. Be it for that 
reason only, the doctrines in question were certainly not held in vain. 
Following Poincaré‟s insights, John Worrall claims that what distinguishes our most 
successful scientific theories is their being „structurally correct11‟. Moreover, „this is            
the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make
12.‟             
The resilience of mathematical structures in spite of radical changes at the 
hypothesis level would provide grounds for a variant of ScR that is usually known 
as Structural (Scientific) Realism
13
 (SScR). Notice again, however, that the case   
for SScR is restricted to physical theories, or to those scientific theories that would 
share with physics a very definite, „special‟ kind of relationship to mathematical 
concepts and methods (see Section 3). Now, what is „structurally correct‟ supposed 
to mean? Surely not, given the realist‟s outlook, merely that the theory is internally 
consistent…Let‟s turn again to Poincaré, who hints at what SScR might be after:   
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„if the equations remain true, it is because the relations preserve their reality14‟.  
One might simply take such „reality preservation‟ to mean that those relations, 
based as they are on well-motivated „structural‟ assumptions (e.g. symmetries, slow 
variation), maintain their agreement with experimental data in the face of drastic 
changes at the hypothesis level. The realist, however, has something far stronger in 
mind: the relations Poincaré invokes would „encode‟ and preserve, 
transtheoretically as it were, a reference to „something out there‟ that does transcend 
theory change. 
It is debatable whether Poincaré would have wholeheartedly embraced SScR.    
That he may have inclined to do so is suggested, at least, by his writing in this 
context about „true relations between real objects15‟. As for the significance of 
transtheoretical retention, Poincaré rules out mere coincidences, holding instead the 
view that a compelling, „simple‟ law must transcend the somewhat gratuitous nature 
and unreliability of hypothesis choice. All the same, recognition of some „epistemic 
invariant‟ need not be regarded as a concession to realism. Nor do Poincaré‟s views 
on the matter greatly differ from what Duhem
16
 characterised as a common, deeply-
felt hunch: that the network of relations physicists work out and validate via careful 
experimentation „reflect‟ or point to some kind of objective natural order.               
A sentiment, however, is not an argument.  
Thus, for the structural realist, putative qualities of physical objects would be 
mostly irrelevant to the operation of a physical theory, and therefore to its predictive 
success. Referring to such qualities can at best offer a transient „metaphysical‟ 
picture that may act as a stimulus to imagination (though this, as Duhem showed, 
may well come at a price). Accordingly, scientists and philosophers should remain 
agnostic with respect to anything but the mathematical, „operative‟ features of         
a successful theory. This position contrasts with ScR in restricting the cognitive 
import of physical theories to their mathematical structure and its empirical 
(predictive) consequences. What makes it a variety of realism is that it is further 
claimed that it is in virtue of that mathematical structure that physical theories are 
and can be successful; and this is presumably so because such structure somehow 
„reflects‟ the „structure of the world‟.  
To help assess the cogency of the case for structural scientific realism, it will be 
convenient to break SScR down into three theses: 
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(i)  The primary, unshakable credo of the realist: a metaphysical claim  
      about the existence of a pre-organised reality. In the words of Elie  
      Zahar
17
:  
„There exists a structured reality of which the mind is a part; and, far from 
imposing their own order on things, our mental operations are simply 
governed by the fixed laws which describe the workings of nature.‟ 
(ii)       Transtheoretical Retention (TTR): 
Regardless of how different they may be in their „driving hypotheses‟, 
successive physical theories that register significant success in predicting 
phenomena have in common certain structural traits e.g. in the form of 
similar or even identical equations. The similarity and retention of those 
traits cannot be sensibly ascribed to chance. 
(iii)  Inference to the best, ‘structural’ explanation (IBSE) 
TTR makes it reasonable to believe that such theories as considered in 
(ii) afford access to genuine aspects of the reality posited in (i). Access is 
provided only through those „structural‟ aspects of the theories that 
withstand radical or „revolutionary‟ changes, and it consists in their 
„latching on to‟ traits of that reality. 
Discussing Zahar‟s claim, with its problematic reference to „laws‟ that both 
„describe‟ and „govern‟ the workings of nature and our cognitive processes, would 
take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Theses (ii) and (iii) are, on the other 
hand, more specific to SScR. Like other more ordinary and, perhaps, more naïve 
varieties of scientific realism, SScR contends that scientific endeavour at its best 
manages to „mirror‟ or to latch on to aspects of the reality (i) postulates. It should be 
stressed again that SScR differs from other brands of ScR in that it is not committed 
to the transtheoretical persistence of entities, e.g. electrons or gravitational fields,  
of which successive theories would give ever more refined or rectified accounts. 
Whatever the actual, exact „furniture‟ of the world may be we will and probably 
could never know. Structural realists are agnostic about all this. The only kind of 
valid knowledge (physical) science can offer, they claim, consists in „revealing‟ 
natural relations – whatever those relations might connect „in the world‟. TTR – the 
persistence of relations despite theory change, however radical – would be a sign 
that those relations capture something genuine, essentially „relational‟, about the 
world. Much of the strength of SScR would lie in its making no stronger claims 
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than can withstand Laudan-style arguments about the devastating effects (for ScR) 
of „scientific revolutions‟. As J. Worrall puts it, „If SS(c)R isn‟t realism then 
nothing defensible is
18‟. If this is so and SScR is found ultimately wanting, then 
nothing but wishful thinking remains of the ambitions of scientific realism.  
One may wonder whether it is possible at all to dissociate mathematical relations in 
a physical theory from other conceptual aspects, which may include statements 
about the kind of entities that are supposedly involved, how they interact and so 
forth. Besides, no mathematical expression in a physical theory is ever 
uninterpreted; no more indeed, than any experimental result is a result unless it can 
be shown to fit within some theoretical framework. Can genuine retention be 
claimed if the quantities involved in „surviving‟ equations have to be thoroughly   
reinterpreted? As Poincaré was well aware however, such interpretations involve 
somewhat conventional images, e.g. of flow or granularity, which are often 
metaphorically carried over from our ordinary experience. Those are temporarily 
substituted for physical Xs we do not, and cannot, directly know about. While such 
images may help figure out the correct equations, what those equations would 
„really‟ capture are relational aspects of the world whose connection to those 
images cannot be ascertained. That connection is loose enough for this extra 
„metaphysical‟ baggage to be discarded without loss. The realist is, nonetheless, 
inclined to believe that – dismissing implausible strokes of luck – there has to be 
something (presumably at some fairly abstract level) to the connection, for a „wrong 
choice‟ of images would not have led to the right equations. 
TTR claims must take into account the fact that quantities involved in „surviving‟ 
mathematical expressions may undergo profound alterations under theory change, 
even if we refer to them with the same names.  Thus, mass in Einstein‟s mechanics 
cannot be readily identified with its namesake in Newton‟s (a distinction between 
invariant mass and the evaluation of „mass‟ in a given inertial frame would simply 
make no sense in the latter). A theory is a complex network of relations and the 
meaning of quantities like mass comes down to their functional role in that network. 
That relations between analogous quantities retain their form is likely to signal the 
adherence of both the accepted and obsolete frameworks to the same set of 
underlying principles (e.g. symmetries). 
TTR, hence structural scientific realism itself, is a thesis about physical theories. 
The role of mathematics in the formulation – indeed, in the very constitution – of 
physical theories will be discussed in Section 3. This will shed light on the reasons 
for the success of Fresnel‟s and other modelling endeavours. In Section 4 a more 
detailed, somewhat heretical look, first at the foundations of „special‟ relativity 
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theory, than at the basic rules of quantum mechanics, will exhibit both the 
underpinnings and the limits of TTR and correspondence claims. Even if TTR 
turned out to be quite unproblematic, there will remain the (in my view insuperable) 
objection that the idea of a connection between well-conceived structural aspects of 
a theory and the putative „structure‟ of the real world cannot in any way be made 
precise, let alone conclusive (Section 5). 
 
 
3. Physics is mathematical 
 
However important its role in their practice, mathematics merely lends biological 
research or economical analysis, for example, the precision of its modelling tools 
and a capacity to yield quantitative predictions and evaluations. It is, however, in no 
essential way constitutive of their subject matter. There is no need for, say the gene 
concept to be given a mathematical expression.   Not so with momentum, energy or 
entropy, whose theoretical import owes everything to the interplay of the 
corresponding mathematical entities. Without the notion of derivative, there is no 
effective idea of instant speed. Introducing and coordinating physical quantities also 
relies on specific, especially algebraic structures: for example, the classical concept 
of velocity makes it implicitly a vector quantity. Mechanical action would amount 
to nothing but a vaguely suggestive word if it were not for Lagrange-Hamilton 
mechanics and the precise definition of characteristic and principal functions. How 
the word energy, used in casual conversation, has come to mean everything and 
nothing shows, a contrario, how a legitimate physical concept becomes vacuous 
when stripped of its precise mathematical expression.  
Its inherent mathematisation lends physics all of its substance and its capacity to 
deliver accurate predictions. In particular, physics benefits from the unique ability 
of mathematics to map representations into others whilst preserving underlying e.g. 
algebraic structures. An early example is provided by Cartesian analytic geometry, 
which substitutes the manipulation of properly defined numerical coordinates for 
traditional figure-based reasoning. Despite his invention of calculus, Newton 
himself still relies heavily on old-style geometric representations and proofs
19
.    
One hundred years after the Principia, Lagrange can boast in the introduction to his 
Méchanique analitique (1787) that he will thoroughly dispense with figures and   
the attendant modes of reasoning. By the end of the eighteenth century physics has 
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fully taken the analytical turn, and another century will be needed for algebraic 
structures, such as vector spaces or groups, to be fully identified and brought into 
play. Complex numbers are a striking instance of the way mathematical entities and 
relations open up new possibilities of representation, often with far-reaching 
consequences. Whilst their arithmetic properties may seem outrageously 
„unnatural‟, it is from their isomorphic mapping to basic geometrical entities and 
planar transformations that they derive most of their conceptual significance and 
usefulness. Nowhere, perhaps, is it exemplified in a more striking way than in their 
deep involvement in the foundations of quantum mechanics, where their 
contribution stems from the interplay of projective geometry, the consistent 
evaluation of probability and the linear representation of groups (see Section 4).  
Owing to a unique ability to expand on its own material, mathematics has a power 
to reach far beyond what might be expected from a symbolic game. This certainly 
goes a long way towards explaining the success and ubiquity of mathematical 
techniques: primarily in physics but also, following the example of the latter and 
capitalising on its success, in more and more „applications‟. It has often been 
pointed out – more to wonder, however, about the fact than to attempt to rationalise 
it – how much twentieth-century physics has taken advantage of the availability of 
concepts and structures that mathematicians had developed without any application 
in sight but for the sake of aesthetic appeal or „structural‟ fecundity. Einstein 
famously „picked up‟ tensor calculus and Riemann‟s differential geometry, which 
just happened to be what he needed to work his way from the postulation of           
an „equivalence principle‟ to a fully fledged „relativistic‟ theory of gravitation.        
The „new‟ kinds of objects (Gesamtheit) that Heisenberg felt compelled to  
introduce in his bold attempt at an operationally motivated quantum-based theory 
were also soon identified by Born as instances of matrices. Conversely, whole fields 
in mathematics were developed as a response to the needs of the physicist. Besides 
Newton‟s invention of differential calculus, a famous example is the later 
introduction of the Fourier transform: whereas Fourier‟s treatment of heat belongs 
to history, the powerful techniques he developed to solve a particular partial 
differential equation are his enduring legacy.  
Mathematics lends to physics its most remarkable ability to give the same „problem‟ 
or theoretical framework several apparently dissimilar but structurally related, e.g. 
isomorphic expressions – just think of the various formulations of classical 
mechanics: Newtonian, Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, or those of quantum mechanics: 
Schrödinger‟s, Heisenberg‟s or Feynman‟s. Each approach yields different insights, 
suggests further or parallel developments. Another most striking aspect of the 
relation of mathematics to physics is how the same relations, or very similar ones, 
e.g. differential equations, occur as the outcome of tackling what may look like 
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radically different situations or problems. This is something that physicists and 
those who comment on their achievements have never ceased to wonder at. 
Feynman calls it „a most remarkable coincidence20‟. This similarity of mathematical 
form comes in handy, for „having studied one subject, we immediately have a great 
deal of direct and precise knowledge about the solutions of the equations of 
another
21‟. For example, knowing the equations of electrostatics „you have learned 
at the same time how to handle many subjects in physics, and…keeping this in 
mind, it is possible to learn almost all of physics in a limited number of years
22‟. 
Unlike others, who merely draw attention to this intriguing and certainly crucial 
aspect of the physics-mathematics relationship, making it an aspect of what they 
deem a mysterious and „unreasonable effectiveness23‟ of the latter, Feynman tries to 
address its origin. „Why are the equations from different phenomena so similar?24‟ 
His initial answer is typical of a scientific realist: the similarity would bear witness 
to „the underlying unity of nature25.‟ What kind of unity, however? For, as Feynman 
puts it in his typically informal way: „The electrostatic potential, the diffusion of 
neutrons, heat flow – are we really dealing with the same stuff?26‟. Feynman, of 
course, knows his subject too well to ignore that the form of differential equations is 
determined, not by the kind of „stuff‟ it refers to, but by the assumptions the 
physicist decides, or feels obliged to make, in his modelling work: 
Is it possible that…the thing which is common to all the phenomena is…        
the framework into which the physics is put? As long as things are reasonably 
smooth in space, then the important things that will be involved will be the rates 
of change of quantities with position in space. That is why we always get an 
equation with a gradient. The derivatives must appear in the form of a gradient 
or a divergence; because the laws of physics are independent of direction, they 
must be expressible in vector form. The equations of electrostatics are the 
simplest vector equations that one can get which involve only the spatial 
derivatives of quantities. Any other simple problem – or simplification of a 
complicated problem – must look like electrostatics. What is common to all our 
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R.P. Feynman, R. Leighton and M. Sands: The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol.2: 
Electromagnetism (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1965). 12-1. 
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 Feynman et al., op. cit., 12-1. 
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 Feynman et al., op.cit., 12-12. 
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 Borrowing from Wigner‟s catchy title: „The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in 
physical science‟, reprinted in E.P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections – Scientific Essays of E.P. 
Wigner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967).  
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problems is that they involve space and that we have imitated what is actually a 
complicated phenomenon by a simple differential equation
27
. 
If Feynman speaks about „imitation‟, it is because he is inclined to regard the 
outcome of modelling as „a smoothed-out approximation to a mechanism 
underneath
28‟ (though he acknowledges difficulties with such a view in e.g. 
quantum electrodynamics). Nevertheless, the occurrence, in the treatment of 
seemingly unrelated problems, of equations whose form turns out to be the same 
may have little, if anything, to do with the nature of whatever unknown mechanisms 
those equations may or may not „approximate‟. Modelling is constrained and 
„driven‟ by expectations that could arguably be traced back to our perception and 
„embodied‟ experience; it is also informed by the previous success – and no less so 
by the occasional failures – of a variety of technical approaches, such as variational 
or perturbation methods. The basic assumptions of modelling: slow variation, 
neglect of higher-order terms, isotropy, homogeneity etc. certainly respond to 
operational and cognitive necessities as much, at least, as they are responses to the 
„pressure‟ of an external world.  Such assumptions actually are a conditio sine qua 
non of mathematical formulation and treatment:  as anyone with experience of 
modelling knows it too well, it takes very slight „corrections‟ to make it all 
untractable. Whatever appearance of unity the similarity of equations points to 
should not, therefore, hastily be ascribed to nature. Such unity might well boil down 
to the range and limitations of our possibilities of conceiving and effectively 
„managing‟ phenomena. It may owe a great deal as well to concessions that must be 
made for an optimal use of the conceptual means and powerful methods 
mathematics afford. If that is so, then TTR in modelling should not come as a great 
surprise. If similar equations occur in theories whose aim or postulated entities may 
be radically different, it is mainly because actual modelling work relies, 
nonetheless, on the same kind of „structural‟ assumptions. One‟s ontological 
preferences might play a more or less decisive part in making such assumptions 
explicit, e.g. through their connecting them with explanatory goals. As Poincaré 
suggests, what matters most is that the physicist be led to decisions that will be just 
those required to yield effective equations. Thus, consistent reasoning „driven‟ by a 
flow metaphor gives rise to similar partial differential equations, whether the object 
of modelling is the motion of an actual fluid, cash „flow‟ in financial markets or 
traffic „flow‟ on road networks. Fresnel‟s picture of a „rippling‟ medium may well 
have been delusory, but it enabled him to carry out a modelling of light propagation 
whose excellence reflects in his getting predictions right, however surprising their 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. Feynman‟s italics. 
28
 Feynman et al., op. cit., 12-13.  
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outcome. Whilst we can only praise Fresnel‟s ingenuity, we have little cause for 
embracing the idea of a reality-driven transtheoretical continuity, besides that of an 
assumption-driven effectiveness. 
Basic frameworks of theoretical physics – frame theories, as I shall now call them – 
are not as easily dealt with as specific models, the scope of which is inherently 
limited. There are three such major frameworks to date: the „special‟ theory of 
relativity (STR), quantum mechanics and their glorious but flawed predecessor, 
classical (Newtonian) mechanics. The transition from one to another involves no 
TTR stricto sensu: basic classical equations did not survive the „relativistic‟ or 
quantum tidal waves. Instead, the links between those theories are usually exhibited 
in some „appropriate‟ limit. However, as we shall see at length in the next section, 
an alternative approach to some of their basic tenets leads to a very different view of 
the mutual relationship of classical mechanics and STR on the one hand, and the 
purpose of quantum theory on the other. This will affect both our assessment of    
the value of „correspondence‟ claims and our judgment about the plausibility of   
the structural realist‟s crucial (IBSE) inference. 
 
 
3. Beyond ‘correspondence’: revisiting the foundations of  
our best frame theories 
 
(i) Relativity without light 
Einstein's „special‟ theory of relativity (STR), as it is understood, taught and 
discussed just about everywhere, is founded on two postulates: (i) The mathematical 
form of the laws of physics is the same in all inertial reference frames; and (ii) The 
speed c at which light – or more generally electromagnetic radiation – propagates in 
vacuo is the same in all inertial frames. Postulating with (ii) the constancy of the 
value of some speed, be it that of light, apparently detracts from the very idea of 
relativity: isn‟t speed, as we ordinarily experience it, hence think of it, an obviously 
frame-dependent quantity? The appearance of paradox is usually resolved by 
invoking the mutual consistency of (i) and (ii): adhering to them both leads to          
a definite, legitimate transformation whose kinematical and dynamical 
consequences have been experimentally vindicated beyond the slightest doubt. 
Besides, the second postulate is that which, most clearly, asserts something about 
the physical world: whilst (i) is a general claim about the indifference of 
mathematical expressions (physical „laws‟) with respect to arbitrary changes          
of reference frames in relative uniform translation, (ii) is a statement about a 
particular manifestation (light) of a specific kind of interaction (electromagnetism). 
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As a youngster, Einstein had a fascination with electric and magnetic phenomena. 
Around the ripe age of 16, he had also been pondering both the nature of light and 
its propagation. The framework he sets up in his 1905 paper yields a final answer to 
some of his early questions. In providing a consistent non-Galilean framework for 
mechanics, his theory also secures the legitimacy of Maxwell‟s electrodynamics, 
which was one of the main concerns of the scientific community at the time.  
Despite the magnitude of the achievement, the feeling may remain that Einstein‟s 
original and now standard two-postulate formulation is not, because of (ii), entirely 
faithful to relativistic objectives. This is all the more so since, as a look at any 
textbook derivation of the Lorentz-Einstein transformation will readily confirm,   
the form of that transformation owes everything to the second postulate, which 
requires the speed of light to have the value c in all inertial frames. The relativity 
postulate (i) is, in itself, too general to help constrain, let alone determine, the form 
of change-of-frame transformations. It merely serves to motivate the search for       
a universal transformation. Given the weight of (ii) in its derivation, the Lorentz 
transformation may not appear to be so much a clear embodiment of „relativity‟     
as  a surprisingly far-reaching consequence of a baffling trait of light.  
Postulate (i) actually is entirely compatible with Galileo‟s views about relative 
motion. On the other hand, since (ii) flatly contradicts „Galilean‟ relativity (e.g. the 
additive composition of all velocities), blocking from the outset a „Galilean 
transformation‟ Galileo himself never derived, a theory based upon (i) and (ii)        
is bound to be inconsistent with Newtonian mechanics. If the latter can no longer  
be deemed valid or „true‟, it does remain very useful for dealing with cases      
where typical velocities have much smaller magnitudes than the speed of light.  
This is sanctioned by the invocation of a „correspondence principle‟ whereby the 




 limit). The conceptual chasm between the two frameworks remains, 
however, breeding (hasty) comments about their mutual „incommensurability‟. 
It is too little-known that both the Galileo and the Lorentz-Einstein transformation 
can be derived from the same set of assumptions
29
. No reference need, or indeed 
should be made in this context to light or electromagnetism (or to any other kind of 
interaction). Following Galileo‟s insights about the essential indifference of 
rectilinear uniform motion to describing or predicting kinematics or dynamics,     
                                                 
29
 Intellectual inertia and Einstein‟s fame as the scientific hero of the twentieth century have been 
quite successful in keeping the public and even most practitioners of STR unaware of this         
„non-secret‟. For examples of its periodic „rediscovery‟, see J.-M. Lévy-Leblond, „One more 
derivation of the Lorentz transformation‟, Am. J. Phys. 44, 271-277 (1976) and M.J. Feigenbaum,    
„The Theory of Relativity – Galileo‟s Child‟, ArXiv.org e-print 0806.1234 (2008).  
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the aim is to work out the general form of the transformation of space coordinates 
and time that regulates passage from one inertial frame to another. The sought 
transformation should be such that, if physical quantities are functions of any of 
those as given in one frame, substituting in the functions their transforms in another 
inertial frame leaves the relations between them essentially unchanged (a change of 
viewpoint should not affect physical laws or the stability of the world).   
There is no reason for assuming that space, as such, is polarised a priori. This is all 
the more so if space is regarded only as an abstract and convenient framework for 
locating objects. We are then free to choose the direction of relative motion of two 
inertial frames as that which coincides with an arbitrary x axis. Specifying the 
transformation rule that regulates passage from an inertial frame R to another one R’ 
will then essentially amount to working out the precise form of two functions of just 
one space (x) and one time (t) variable: x’ = F(x,t) and t’=G(x,t). Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to expect the transformation of any space or time interval not to depend 
on the endpoints of that interval (all intervals of a given amplitude a should 
transform by the rule into intervals of the same amplitude a’). This homegeneity 
requirement strongly constrains the form of F and G: the only ones that fit the bill 
are linear functions of their inputs, i.e. 'x x t    and 't x t   . Taking explicity 
into account the relative motion, with velocity v in the x direction, of the two 
frames then reduces from four to two the number of unknown coefficients. The 
remaining two are both functions of v only and their form is determined by a group-
theoretical requirement: if R , R’ and R" are any three inertial reference frames in 
relative rectilinear motion then any given F,G transformation from R to R’ followed 
by one similar transformation from R’ to R" should be equivalent to a single 
transformation of the same form between R and R". Eventually, it is required that 
the transformation rule be unaffected if relative motion is replaced with a mirror 
image of itself. Together, those assumptions completely determine the form of     
the transformation:          






















   
Three possibilities follow, depending on the sign of the parameter . A strictly 
positive value can be ruled out in view of its anomalous consequences.                 
For example, composing the velocities of two motions in the same direction       








 (which follows from the 
assumptions) could then result in relative motion in the opposite direction (v”<0) ! 
The =0 option yields the Galileo transformation, which Newton‟s mechanics 
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implicitly assumes and which appeared to be borne out by all experiments until    
the last decades of the nineteenth century.  
The dimensionless 21 v factor in the remaining case (<0) is a function of      
the relative velocity v of the two frames. Let us, just for the sake of argument, 
indulge in some alternative history: suppose that the above derivation had been 
achieved prior to that of a package of equations for electromagnetism. If we assume 
in this context – rather unrealistically – sufficiently advanced technology (accurate 
clocks, and perhaps fast flying machines), comparison of the readings of previously 
synchronised clocks
30
 after they had been set in relative motion could have revealed 
(tiny) discrepancies between those time readings, thereby calling into question the 
„obvious truth‟ of the Galilean conception. This would have been achieved without 
any incongruous reference to electromagnetism or the propagation of light. Given 
the relative velocity v of the two clocks, an empirical evaluation of  would have 
immediately followed from the ratio 21 v of the two times. This is not all, 
however, for the new „universal constant‟  happens to have the dimensions of the 












factor could have been regarded, as it currently is, as implying a 
structurally imposed limit  to the relative velocity of two inertial frames.         
Two-clock data would have revealed that this velocity is very high compared to 
anything that had ever been experienced, or even anything one might reasonably 
expect to experience. Had one, however, measured the speed of light, coincidence 
of its value in vacuo with the empirical evaluation of  would certainly have come 
as a major surprise
31
. Subsequent realisation that an adequate set of equations for 
electromagnetism is covariant under a „-transform‟ would then have been 
welcomed as evidence of their consistency with the empirically validated <0 
mechanical framework. There would have arisen nothing of the difficulties 
                                                 
30
 Despite Einstein‟s famous discussion of clock synchronisation (in the first part of his 1905                            
Zur Elektrodynamik article), such synchronisation need not involve light – and why should it?       
If Einstein makes sure that his procedure does, this is because he is primarily concerned with the 
question of light and the consistency of electromagnetism with mechanics. In fact, Galileo himself 
had come up with an ingenious, light-free modus operandi for ensuring that clocks are properly 
synchronised (that his own clocks were clepsydrae only makes it somewhat impractical if what one 
aims to do is tell apart the =0 and the <0 variants of relativity theory…). See Feigenbaum, op.cit. 
for a brief discussion of Galileo‟s procedure. 
31
 Shouldn‟t we be just as surprised to see, on the standard account, a „strange‟ aspect of light 
determine the basic transformation rule of a relativity theory? Why  happens to coincide with the 
speed of light is just as much an enigma today as it was in 1905.  
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Maxwell, Lorentz or Poincaré had found themselves confronted to, until Einstein 
arrived and cut the Gordian knot with the sharp blade of his second postulate. 
Let‟s briefly consider the kind of dynamics that complies with the -transformation.           
The principle of inertia remains valid: a body that is not acted upon must retain its 
unaccelerated motion. The other laws of mechanics must be reconsidered to take 
into account the connection the -transformation establishes between space and 
time variables. Conservation of momentum remains as a basic requirement, tied as 
it is, via Noether‟s theorem, to invariance of dynamics under arbitrary space 
displacements. The simple Newtonian massvelocity definition of momentum is, 
however, inconsistent with the non-additive law for composing velocities.    
Defining momentum as p = γmv is a convenient choice that yields the classical 
Newtonian form in the 0
v

  limit. The energy variation dE for a system that 















p r  exhibits both duality for 
E

 and p and 
for t and r. Most significantly, the terms in each product are „Noether pairs‟ which 
associate a variable (respectively t, r) and a physical quantity (respectively E, p) 
such that the invariance of dynamics under a displacement or shift in the value of 
the variable is signalled by conservation of the associated quantity. The left hand 
side of the equation expresses an invariant of the same form as the kinematic 
invariant d(t)2 – dr2 (the latter invariant is implicit in the transformation law). This 
„scalar product‟ form and the abovementioned duality suggest that energy and 
momentum transform according to the same -transformation as time and space 
coordinates. Given the definition of p, this implies for the energy E = γm2.    
Again, identification of the value of  with the speed c of light is an empirical 
matter. There is no apparent reason why the two should actually coincide, nor is it 
clear a priori that  should be „actualised‟ in any kind of physical phenomenon32. 
A consistent and effective relativistic framework ensures that physical quantities 
transform in an appropriate manner when one switches from one inertial frame to 
another, thereby providing a sound „topochronometric‟ background for mechanics. 
Such a framework should be defined and operate regardless of any reference to 
specific interactions or entities. The assumptions one makes in order to derive the 
                                                 
32
 Discovering any (minute) discrepancy between  and c would undermine Einstein‟s two-
postulate formulation of STR. The generic <0 relativistic framework, however, would retain its 
validity. The question would remain as to why the values of  and c should be so close to each 
other. 
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form of the -transformation: isotropy, homogeneity and compliance with a group 
law are, broadly speaking, expressions of „operational‟ requirements. It is hard to 
figure out how these might – to the extent they should – be „enforced‟ by the 
structure or constitution of the physical world. That the Galileo and the Lorentz 
transformation are actually derived from the same set of assumptions should also 
prompt a reevaluation of the relationship between the Newtonian and STR 
frameworks. If anything, the latter cannot be regarded as simply „correcting‟ the 
former. Its later emergence is easily accounted for: the Galilean option is that which 
matches our ordinary experience and the associated expectations. Experimentation 
with advanced means is required to record any discrepancy with the assumed =0 
case and give empirical backing to the only viable alternative (<0). Indeed, it took  
tell-tale „anomalies‟ of electromagnetism and the „lucky coincidence‟ of  with the 
speed of light for the Galilean option (never deemed an „option‟ until then) to be 
challenged and finally overthrown. Although STR and its Galilean predecessor 
follow from the same set of premises, the two frameworks may be deemed 
„incommensurable‟ insofar as they are associated with mutually exclusive choices 
of the parameter . A limited and certainly useful „correspondence‟ between the two 
frameworks happens to be made possible because an invariant velocity  can be 
substituted for the constant , allowing smooth transition from one framework to 
the other in the 0
v

 limit. The procedure comes in handy and it may be 
„reassuring‟, but this changes nothing, of course, to the mutual exclusiveness of    
the =0 and <0 cases. 
A realist might still insist that, regardless of the operational character of                
the derivation of the -transformation, the world is nonetheless (<0, =c)-
relativistic. One of the two possibilities must somehow have been objectively 
„selected‟, and our conceptual inclinations or theoretical ingenuity can have nothing 
to do with the matter. Doesn‟t the identity of  and c point to such natural 
underpinnings? Modelling and numerical simulation suggest otherwise: the world 
may not so much be „relativistic‟, i.e. non-Galilean, than we are bound, qua 
observers, to experience „it‟ as such. Starting from a random distribution within a 
finite radius, a random walk model whose dynamics is not rotationally invariant at 
the micro-level leads to the emergence, in the long run, of a distribution that is 
invariant under the continuous group of rotations. Assuming equal probabilities for 
„opposite‟ motions in the lattice, a Galilean transformation slows down the 
evolution
33
 of the binomial distribution by a factor γ-2. It takes a „Lorentz‟ 
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 In this model, „proper time‟ is measured by the standard deviation. T. Toffoli, „How Cheap Can 
Mechanics‟ First Principles Be?‟, in W.H. Zurek, (ed.): Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of 
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transformation, followed by a further scaling by a factor γ-1, to counteract this effect 
and to restore the dynamics. A more refined lattice-gas model of diffusion
34
 yields 
similar if indirect results. Here, dynamics is deterministic and reversible at the 
micro-level, but it gives rise to just the same macro-level phenomenology as         
the random walk. The system is a one-dimensional cellular automaton with a given 
lattice spacing. As the spacing goes to zero (continuum limit), this model exhibits 
exact Lorentz covariance  in the following sense: starting from an initially uniform 
distribution with fixed linear density, the probability distribution converges in the 
continuum limit to the solution of the „telegrapher‟s equation‟ (the same distribution 
also converges, in the infinite time limit, to the solution of the diffusion equation – 
another partial differential equation – just as the binomial distribution does).       
The telegrapher‟s equation was originally derived by Oliver Heaviside in the 1880s 
as an essential part of his transmission line model. Its form can be traced back to 
Maxwell‟s equations, from which it inherits the „built-in‟ property of Lorentz 
invariance. The form of the telegrapher‟s equation is closely related to that of the 
Klein-Gordon equation, which provides a non-Galilean ( = c) version of 
Schrödinger's equation for the treatment of a spinless system
35
. This model, together 
with other
36
 studies in lattice dynamics, suggests that compliance with the 
requirements of STR might be an emergent phenomenon, to which the actual nature 
of the underlying dynamics is to a large extent if not entirely irrelevant.  If that is so, 
„selection‟ might come down to an „anthropic‟statement: Lorenz covariance might 
be the only form of relativity that is compatible with our situation  as macroscopic 
observing-cognising agents, even though our ordinary experience tends to impose, 
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 T. Toffoli, op.cit., 4.2. 
35
 Another equation of the same form is the so-called hyperbolic heat equation, which was 
introduced to overcome the inconsistency of Fourier‟s equation with the requirements of STR.  
This is achieved by „upgrading‟ the parabolic form of Fourier‟s equation to hyperbolic form,         
in order to make it compatible with the nonpositive metric of STR (the Lorenz transformation can 
be regarded as a hyperbolic rather than circular rotation, because of a 1-1 mapping between a 
planar rotation by a given angle and a Lorentz transformation with a given velocity). 
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 T. Toffoli, „Four Topics in Lattice Gases: Ergodicity, Relativity, Information Flow and Rule 
Compression for Parallel Lattice-Gas Machines, in Discrete Kinetic Theory, Lattice Gas Dynamics 
and Foundations of Hydrodynamics, R. Monaco (ed.) (Singapore: World Scientific, 1989), pp.343-
354. 
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(ii) The two faces of probability calculus 
Quantum theory is a uniquely puzzling blend of probability and linear structure. 
Dogmatic views and hype notwithstanding, there are compelling grounds for 
regarding its effective backbone, which following M. Redhead
37
 we may call the 
„Statistical Algorithm of Quantum Mechanics‟ (SAQM), as nothing but a linear 
variant of ordinary probability calculus. Indeed, Lucien Hardy has recently derived 
both the SAQM and a vector formulation of classical probability calculus from 
three or four simple axioms
38
. The probabilities of a complete set of K mutually 
exclusive measurement outcomes can, with no loss of generality, be written down 
as components of a K-dimensional vector. The key observation is then made that         
a „single shot‟ measurement can at most distinguish between N outcomes; indeed,  
if „measurement‟ consists in coin tosses, only one of two sides ever shows up.     
The first axiom asserts the existence of a functional relation between K and N, 
which moreover should be the simplest possible (there is no reason for deeming K 
and N equal a priori, although it may not be easy to come up with an ordinary 
counterexample). Since constraints will typically reduce the number of possible 
outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that the dimensionality K of the probability 
vector space should be reduced accordingly (this is Hardy‟s second axiom). In the 
case of simultaneous dice throws, of jointly produced pairs of particles etc., how do 
the K and N for pairs relate to those that correspond to measurements performed on 
their members separately? If measurements suffice to determine the probability 
vector for each of the two subsystems respectively, let‟s assume that such 
measurements are, together, sufficient to completely determine the probability 
vector that pertains to the combined system („local accessibility‟ thesis39). Letting 
K1 and K2 be the dimensions of the probability vector spaces relative to each pair 
member, and N1 and N2 be the related N (through Axiom 1), the assumption 
amounts to letting K = K1K2 and N=N1N2 (Axiom 3). The underlying intuition is 
that a scheme that implements local accessibility will make optimal use of the 
information supplied by measurements performed separately on the two 
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 M.L.G. Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
p.5. 
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 L. Hardy, „Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms‟, Arxiv.org e-print quant-ph/0101012 
(2001);  L. Hardy, „Why is Nature described by Quantum Theory?‟, in J. D. Barrow, P.C.W. 
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 The local accessibility idea is introduced by W.K. Wootters, „Local Accessibility of Quantum 
States‟, in W.H. Zurek (ed.): Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information: Proceedings of 
the Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Vol.8 (Redwood City CA: Addison-
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subsystems. Together, the three axioms entail that K = N
r
, where r is a positive 
integer. The simplicity requirement of Axiom 1 further restricts the possible values 
of r to 1 and 2. The r=1 (K = N) case is nothing but a vector space formulation of 
classical probability theory, whereas r=2 yields all the essential features of the 
SAQM. In both cases there is unitary evolution of probability vectors between 
observations. „Reduction‟ of the probability vector in the r=2 case also signals 
nothing but the update of probability upon acquisition of new information.   
Besides, Hardy‟s derivation settles a vexed issue: why the SAQM should require a 
Hilbert space to be defined over the field of complex numbers. As it turns out, real 
Hilbert spaces cannot accommodate local accessibility: the specification of 
probability vectors in the bipartite case would then require more (K>K1K2) than can 
provide data gathered locally on the two subsystems.  
The type of K-to-N relationship Hardy‟s axioms imply apparently comes down to a 
question of distinguishability. The realist might be tempted to argue that the 
empirical adequacy of the r=2 option is determined by the nature or properties of 
the physical entities, deemed in that case „quantal‟, the measurements are referred 
to. The very fact that the SAQM is actually derived from the same set of 
assumptions as classical probability calculus, which is obviously not a physical 
theory, should prompt caution in this matter. We might rather expect a r=2 scheme 
to have potentially wider applicability than one might have surmised, given our 
knowledge of one instance only of such a scheme, namely quantum mechanics. 
There are indeed some successful, or at least promising, instances of such 
application outside physics
40. As for the „selection‟ issue, Hardy reduces it to 
acceptance or rejection of a continuity requirement:  in a r=2 framework like the 
SAQM, any probability vector can be continuously and reversibly transformed into 
an arbitrarily large number of other probability vectors – this is indeed what 
„superpositions‟ are  all about. The „classical‟ (r=1) alternative excludes the 
possibility of any such transformation. Bearing in mind that probability vectors 
need not be regarded as representatives of „states‟, there is little reason for claiming 
that the continuity-based r=1 vs. r=2 distinction „reflects‟ anything essential about 
an objective physical world.  
Besides Hardy‟s, other partial contributions can be brought together, leading to 
similar conclusions. Suppose that we wish to label with „amplitudes‟ i.e. real or 
possibly complex numbers a connection we establish, for purposes of prediction, 
between a given „initial preparation‟ (I) and a „target event‟ (T). Ensuring that those 
amplitudes combine in a consistent way then suffices to determine their 
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composition laws. Letting S be an intermediate event, such that it can be ascertained 
that the IT transition does proceed via S, the amplitude for the IT transition is 
expected to be a function f of the „partial‟ amplitudes one has assigned to IS and 
ST. Likewise, if S‟ and S” are alternative events, the total amplitude will be a 
function g of the amplitudes for the mutually exclusive IS‟T and IS”T 
sequences.   Consistent labelling then requires that both functions be associative and 
that f be distributive over g. Assuming those functions are analytical, then f and g 
yield
41
 Feynman‟s rules for the combination of amplitudes i.e. coefficients in 
superpositions: the amplitudes combine as a product for a sequence and as a sum for 
mutually exclusive „paths‟. One step further towards „recovery‟ of the SAQM 
consists in letting amplitudes be the coordinates of suitable vectors
42
. Requiring that 
probability, as a function of amplitude, retain its form under vector basis changes 
implies a power form relationship of probability to amplitude. Finally, demanding 
that this form be consistent with the metric structure of the representative space, 
associated with the definition of a scalar product and norm, leads
43
 to the basic 
probability rule of the SAQM: probability as the squared modulus of the total 
amplitude. It is a shortcoming of the abovementioned derivation of composition 
rules for amplitudes that the nature of the field over which the metric vector space 
(Hilbert space) must be defined remains undetermined. In the case of quantum 
mechanics, recognising the need for amplitudes to be generally complex must be 
postponed until group-theoretical relationships among physically significant 
quantities are properly taken into account. 
It is legitimate to wonder why one should bother at all to introduce such 
„amplitudes‟ as an auxiliary device for prediction, i.e. for the calculation of 
probabilities. The best answer, albeit one that requires a lot of clarification, appears 
to be that amplitudes enhance statistical distinguishability. Suppose that one decides 
to test three variables on a population. The probability triple for each population can 
be represented as a point on a triangle or „simplex‟. Letting each probability be the 
square of a (real) amplitude, all of the amplitude triples then lie on a curvilinear 
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triangle, which is „stretched‟ relative to the probability simplex. If two populations 
A and B are such that probabilities assigned to some of their features appear to be 
closer than those for two other populations C and D, as shown by the distance 
between the corresponding points on the simplex, then A and B might seem to be 
harder to distinguish from each other than C from D on the basis of the considered 
variables. Statistical analysis will, however, sometimes belie this impression. 
Whenever this occurs, switching to amplitudes will show the apparent difference    
to be merely an artefact of the linear representation, for on the curved triangle      
the distance between A and B may be the same
44
 as that between C and D.         
This suggests that optimising the distinguishability of probability distributions is a 
key trait and possibly the defining feature of a predictive scheme like the SAQM, 
whether its formulation explicitly makes use of amplitudes (whose modulus, 
equivalent to Hilbert space angle, yields a measure of statistical distance
45
) or it 
takes the general form of a r=2 Hardy framework.  
Granted that its „nonclassical‟ features are those of a specific kind of probabilistic 
algorithm, quantum mechanics is nonetheless a physical theory
46
. What makes it 
such owes everything to the linear representation of groups. Group-theoretical 
considerations shape and constrain physical quantities, the distribution of their 
possible (measurable) values and their mutual relationships. Given the specific 
structure of the SAQM, they also determine the relative phases of amplitudes and 
the fact that those amplitudes are more generally complex
47
. Fundamental types of 
invariance in pre-quantum mechanics are connected to space-time symmetries 
associated with translations, rotations and inertial transformations (STR substitutes 
the Poincaré group for the Galileo group). In quantum mechanics, such symmetries 
work together with the linear and projective structure of the SAQM to determine  
the form of the operator representatives of physical quantities and the constitution 
of their spectra. If the modulus of the inner product of any two predictive vectors is 
to be invariant under a symmetry transformation of Hilbert space, then Wigner‟s 
theorem implies that the transformation must be implemented by either a unitary or 
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an anti-unitary operator. If such transformations form a group, then the 
corresponding operators must satisfy the multiplicative group law. Since vectors 
that differ by a global phase factor yield identical predictions, there must exist a 
unitary projective representation of the group in the Hilbert space „of‟ the system. 
Which types of systems are possible comes down to the types of linear group 
representations that can be accommodated. In the case of space-time symmetries,       
the relevant groups are continuous i.e. Lie groups, whose representations can only 
be unitary. The Stone-Naimark theorem then guarantees the existence, for any one-
dimensional subgroup of the symmetry group, of a self-adjoint operator that is the 
infinitesimal generator of the group, thereby yielding a representation of the Lie 
algebra of the symmetry group
48
. Insofar as the self-adjoint operators are 
expressions of invariance under space-time transformations, they fulfil the most 
elementary requirements for being regarded as representatives of basic physical 
quantities. The association, via Noether‟s theorem, of continuous space-time 
symmetries with conservation laws – of energy with time translations, of angular 
momentum with rotations etc. – provides the best available justification for the 
usual practice of referring to those operators using the names of their classical 
analogues: Hamiltonian, angular momentum and so on. Such terminological usage 
may well trigger unwarranted expectations and therefore be a source of puzzlement 
when those are not fulfilled. Nevertheless, its legitimacy is not ultimately based 
upon vague analogies or „correspondence‟ with classical physics. Losing 
Anschaulichkeit might also be the price one has to pay for the group-theoretical 
foundation of basic quantities like linear and angular momentum to be put on a firm 
basis: for example, commutators are direct expressions of deep structural 
relationships among Lie algebra elements, which the Poisson brackets of Newtonian 
mechanics merely hinted at. The i   form of the quantum mechanical 
„counterpart‟ of classical momentum is also recognised as nothing but a 
displacement operator
49
, which directly signals the link between conservation of 
momentum and invariance under arbitrary space shifts (something the classical 
expression of momentum offers no clue about). 
If something substantial ends up being carried over from classical to quantum 
mechanics, enabling „correspondence‟ and fuelling hopes among the realists, this is 
because those two frameworks, despite all their dissimilarities, must hinge on 
similar prerequisites regarding space, time and their mutual relationships. In the 
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quantum mechanical setting, the familiar descriptive, „anschaulich‟ style of 
classical mechanics gives way to the blind efficiency of a probabilistic algorithm 
(SAQM), whose symbolic machinery is brought to bear on group-theoretically 
regulated physical quantities. Classical and quantum mechanics are too dissimilar in 
the way they handle those essential prerequisites and develop their consequences for 
classical relations to actually „survive‟ the change. Thus, Newton‟s Second Law and 
the expression of force as the gradient of potential are „recovered‟ only as the 
outcome of an averaging procedure (Ehrenfest‟s theorem). The possibility and 
usefulness of „translating‟ classical quantities into an operator form entirely hinges 
on the common group-theoretical roots of the „corresponding‟ classical and 
quantum mechanical quantities. Such correspondence rules certainly make for 
convenient shortcuts. However, this cosy procedure cannot provide a justification 
for the introduction of quantities like spin, which has no classical analogue. A 
thoroughly group-theoretical approach is required for spin to be accounted for, and 
the latter emerges as just another variety of angular momentum, with its 
fundamental association to rotation. Yet another weakness of correspondence 
claims is that quantum mechanics yields more than one „classical limit‟, thereby 
raising thorny consistency issues
50
.  
Hardy‟s axioms are just as operational as are the assumptions from which the joint 
derivations of the Lorentz and Galileo transformations follow. Nothing in them 
clearly or plausibly points to any „pressure‟ from a prestructured external world, 
which would somehow result in a r=2 scheme being enforced as „nature‟s choice‟.  
A key to the efficiency of the SAQM may well be its ability to optimise                
the distinguishability of probability distributions, as encapsulated e.g. in a        
Hardy vector. Can such ability even make sense as an inherent trait of external, 
„observer‟-free reality?  
As for those considerations of symmetry and invariance that determine and 
guarantee the „physicality‟ of both the classical and the quantum mechanical 
frameworks, the possibility of imputing them all to the constitution of the physical 
world remains open, but neither more nor less than they had been before the 
emergence of the quantum. However, the „Noetherian‟ justification of conservation 
laws as reflections of invariance under space or time shifts, rotations and so on 
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might just as well, if not better, be regarded as expressing essential operational or 
cognitive requirements for theoretical effectiveness.  
 
 
5. The structural leap (of faith) 
 
The resilience of equations and formulae under theory change strongly suggests that 
modelling success is to a large extent insensitive to metaphysical tenets and 
ontological preferences. More often than not, these might rather raise obstacles to 
scientific progress – hence Duhem‟s rejection of „explanation‟ as the aim of a 
physical theory
51
. Occasionally though, such „metaphysical‟ preconceptions may 
prompt just those decisions that lead to the success of a model. This may happen, 
for example, through suggesting a specific mathematical representation of spatial or 
temporal variation, thereby determining the type of mathematical objects involved 
(e.g. a divergence or laplacian) and the form of the differential equations that 
connect them. Following a „natural‟ human disposition, significant success will 
commonly be imputed to the validity of the postulated ontology…until further 
developments make the ontology untenable, despite the predictive success of the 
model(s) it fostered.  
Like any (other) form of art, modelling is never as successful as when it is more 
severely constrained. The model must comply with the principles of accepted frame 
theories, e.g. conservation of energy or momentum. Moreover, „realistic‟ 
assumptions have to be weighed against the necessity of ending up with equations 
that can be solved. It is little wonder that linearity is so pervasive an assumption in 
physics and engineering, where magnitudes of higher order than the first are 
routinely and knowingly neglected. Basic ideal systems such as the harmonic 
oscillator are paradigmatic, whereas nonlinearity or anharmonicity signal the 
beginning of computational difficulties. Because of all those needs and concessions, 
widespread similarities in mathematical treatment and its outcome (e.g. partial 
differential equations of the same form) are inevitable; but there can be no 
guarantee that what the theories describe are similar objects or even similar 
circumstances
52
. In any case, resemblances in mathematical formulation and 
                                                 
51
 Duhem, op.cit.  
52
 Crowd behaviour or road traffic can be modelled using adaptations of the mathematical tools that 
were developed towards the end of the 19
th
 century for the statistical molecular treatment of gases.  
The outcome of such modelling can be remarkably (surprisingly?) informative. For a nontechnical 
presentation, see P. Ball, Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another (London: Arrow Books, 
2005). 
 29 
treatment can always be traced back to conceptual and methodological decisions 
that determine the success (or the failure) of a modelling endeavour. 
Some sort of structural continuity between our „ex-best‟ and our currently most 
successful frame theories can also be exhibited. This is typically achieved via taking 
the „appropriate‟ limit or the application of correspondence rules. The procedure, 
however, can yield little insight into the roots of the structural link. Why should a 
theoretical framework, which is radically different both in its conceptual make-up 
and its practical use from its predecessor, allow the latter to be „retrieved‟ in some 
limit – which moreover is not generally unique? A fresh, metaphysically unbiased 
look at the foundations of our most consistently successful theoretical frameworks 
can, as I tried to show in Section 4, improve our understanding of their structural 
similarities. If the latter are evidence of unity, such unity may well essentially come 
down to our ways and possibilities of observing, acting and conceiving. What does 
chiefly, and possibly only matter, is that consistency be guaranteed, that basic types 
of invariance be satisfied, that the simplest or most parsimonious formulation of 
laws be found, and finally that effective computation be feasible. Wishful thinking 
aside, none of the basic assumptions from which Galilean and „special‟ relativity 
can be jointly derived, nor any of Hardy‟s axioms can be clearly regarded as 
expressions of natural „dispositions‟ or of a natural order. Is it sensible, then, to 
believe that they can afford insights into „the way the world is‟, regardless of our 
cognitive and operational requirements and limitations? Is it wise to ignore the 
weight of such constraints and considerations in favour of one‟s favourite, hence 
„best‟ explanation, namely the epistemological thesis (iii) of SScR?  
Besides, there is something highly problematic about the structural realist‟s IBE.  
As expected,  structure is the key word in both theses (ii) and (iii). There‟s the rub, 
for making a valid inference from (ii) to (iii) requires either that the word structure 
have exactly the same reference in both theses or that a definite, unambiguous 
relationship hold (provably, or at least plausibly) between its two occurrences. Can 
the structural realist honestly meet either of these requirements? Physical theories 
are, so to speak, „structural‟ at their core, and so is the ultimate source of their 
enduring success. Indeed, never has their scope and predictive efficiency been so 
great as since physics parted from more ordinary intuitions, placing its trust instead 
in the sublime effectiveness of mathematical abstraction. Using the word structure    
in this context certainly lacks the precision it has when, in mathematics, one speaks 
about such specific structures as rings, groups or vector spaces. Here, invoking 
structure is merely a way of expressing one‟s acknowledgment of the central role  
of mathematics in the constitution and predictive power of physical theories.    
There is no denial of that. More precision is required, however, in order to identify 
structural links within or across theories. These typically rely on or take the form of 
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a mapping between definite structures, the latter word being understood in the 
precise sense it may have, for example, in algebra. Thus in quantum mechanics    
the existence of a one-one mapping of the Poincaré sphere into the Bloch sphere 
highlights the fundamentally identical two-dimensional Hilbert space treatment of 
photon polarisation and spin ½ systems. That‟s what invoking structure is and 
should be, if it is to be meaningful at all. 
The structural realist, however, is not interested in „merely‟ exhibiting morphisms:            
(s)he wants to see in TTR conclusive evidence that genuinely successful theories 
capture or latch on to structural aspects of physical reality. The claim may appear 
convincing insofar as it is based upon the invocation of „structure‟ both at the level 
of theories – where the word can be precisely defined, and structural issues 
addressed in all necessary detail with due accuracy – and by reference to a pre-
existing objective world. SScR contends that it is by virtue of their „structural‟ 
qualities, and only so, that physical theories would afford „clues‟ about that world 
(what those clues are remains unspecified besides their presumably involving 
„relations‟ between unfathomable Xs53). Substantiating IBSE requires that the 
structural realist be capable of arguing for some definite and plausible kind of 
correspondence between those two levels. For the idea of such correspondence not 
to be empty talk, some definite form of mapping must at least be conceivable 
between those structures that are identified among or across theories, and the 
„structures‟ of physical reality that thesis (iii) invokes. The idea of such mapping is 
inherently problematic, for to make use of an analogy: what can a language           
be translated into, if not another language? Linguistic structures do not „reflect‟ in 
any meaningful, precise and useful sense „true relations in the world‟, even though 
language has proved to be for our species a tremendous asset (as well as an 
occasional curse). Should we assume that the world-as-it-is is „mathematical‟, as 
physicists or science popularisers often proclaim
54
 without apparently fearing to 
sound inept? Should we rather believe that mathematics is uniquely suited to afford 
genuine glimpses of an ethereal Logos, which would both (literally) „inform‟ the 
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physical world and enable (?) our knowledge thereof? But then, do the success and 
most significant structural traits of physical theories warrant belief in their latching 
on to natural or Platonic „structures‟ any more than the observed complexity of 
biological systems warrants belief in transcendent design?  
(S)ScR owes much of its appeal, as much as it responds, to one of our least 
resistible inclinations, which is to attribute whatever experience we deem „solid‟ to 
a reality that stands outside ourselves. We cannot posit the existence of anything 
unless we (tacitly) position ourselves as „confronting‟ an „out there‟ (if etymology is 
any guide: to exist is, literally, to „stand outside‟). No wonder if scientific realism, 
its structural variant included, may sound somewhat circular: on the one hand, the 
observed evolution of theories is supposed to lend credence to the possibility  of 
accessing, or approaching, timeless truths about the world; on the other hand, the 
scientific realist feels compelled to believe in convergence precisely because of her 
belief that scientific research must be shaped, constrained or „governed‟ – be it 
„structurally‟– by an external, preorganised reality.  
If something is to count as real, it must be what it is or as it is regardless of the ways 
„external‟ observers may choose to interact, or accidentally end up interacting with 
it. It is therefore tempting to reify invariant quantities, to believe that such quantities 
offer glimpses of a stable and objective, observation or abstraction-independent 
reality. However, seeing in invariance a criterion for reality does not entail that 
exhibiting any given invariant is a reliable token of reality. The invariants the 
physicist is concerned with are such only given a set of (assumed or actual) 
experimental or perceptual conditions – what may be referred to as a context. 
Whatever remains constant never „does‟ so absolutely: invariance is an operational 
concept. In mathematics, this requires the specification of a complete set of 
operations that leave unchanged whatever entities are concerned (these operations 
usually form a group).  Despite a tendency to focus on the entities themselves as the 
locus or source of invariance, the latter is a structural property of a set of operations 
rather than „external‟ objects.  
Eventually, what the scientific realist cannot come to terms with is the possibility 
that the conceptual or structural content of physical theories may not „mirror‟ 
substantial or relational aspects of an „external‟ world but, nonetheless, be effective 
and intellectually inspiring. With the inclination to reify-objectify, there often goes 
a profound reluctance to even contemplate any alternative to realism; any other 
approach would make the success of scientific theories exceedingly improbable. 
Thus, John Worrall takes it as „the default assumption‟ that, given TTR between 
predictively successful theories, „they have latched on in some way to the „deep 
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structure‟ of the universe55.‟ The most SScR can do, however, is to draw attention to 
a significant degree of TTR or to certain striking structural similarities, thereby 
drawing an incentive for believing in the ability of successive, successful physical 
theories to capture fundamental and objective traits of reality. It is a fatal weakness 
of SScR, which it shares with all varieties of (scientific) realism, that all it can 
provide is such an incentive.  
If the „structural‟ move cannot salvage scientific realism and if nothing else can, are 
we then bound to surrender to instrumentalism and its uninspiring conception of 
science? Well, maybe not. Neo-Kantian epistemologies and radical constructivism
56
 
may have their say in the matter. The latter substitutes functionality and the search 
for viable solutions for the realist horizon of ultimate truth or „match‟ with a 
preexistent and prestructured reality. To alleviate the worst fears of the realist, this 
is not so much a matter of questioning the existence of reality (metaphysical thesis 
(i)) as that of challenging the epistemological thesis of (S)ScR: that „latching on to‟ 
reality must be the best, let alone the only sensible explanation for the success of 
science. It is certainly fair to say than none of those suggested alternatives has, so 
far, brought forth much of significant value besides rather abstruse statements and 
quite a lot of „postmodernist‟ hype. However, one should certainly heed some 
promising developments in cognitive science and neurobiology
57
, for these might 
prove invaluable in shedding light on the nature of both mathematics and 
experience, hence contribute to our figuring out how their combination can be, as it 
has been, so reasonably effective.  
Perhaps we should just learn to live with the perspective that the existence of 
physical reality and the nature of its connection to our intellectual efforts are 
hopelessly undecidable –with the only comforting thought that they are certainly not 
provably so. This being said, the urge to attribute stable or effective features of our 
experience to the „external‟ world is unlikely to ever die out, or even significantly 
weaken. 
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